The Shifting Fortunes of Chitpavan Brahmans: Focus on 1948

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ASSASSINATION OF MAHATMA GANDHI BY MAHARASHTRIAN BRAHMAN

When a well-dressed, determined man pulled out a revolver and killed Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi on January 30th of 1948, the shots in New Delhi were heard around the world and brought on universal grief and revulsion. Much has been written about the act and its perpetrator—the conspiracy, trial and ultimate punishment.[1] But little has been written on the repercussions of Nathuram Vinayak Godse's act on his own caste, on the Chitpavan Brahmans of Maharashtra.[2]

Let me put Godse's act, and its repercussions into context—a context indeed of great violence. By January 1948 India had been independent less than six months. The preceding eighteen months had seen communal violence in Bengal, Bihar, Punjab—violence on a previously unimaginable scale, with millions killed or forced to flee.[3] Independence had brought partition. The newly created Islamic nation of Pakistan, as one of its first acts, instigated an invasion of the Hindu-ruled princely state of Kashmir by Northwest Frontier tribesmen. The fate of princely states ruled by Muslims was unclear, with Hyderabad and Junagadh refusing to join the new Dominion of India. Communist bands and the Razakar militia were battling it out in the Andhra section of the Nizam's Dominions. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Hindu Mahasabha were whipping up ultra-Hindu sentiment everywhere in an attempt to prevent further sell-out—as they saw it—to Pakistan, a policy they believed Mahatma Gandhi supported. A warning bomb was thrown in Gandhi's prayer-meeting on January 20th, and finally on January 30th Godse shot the Mahatma.

VIOLENT REACTION IN MAHARASHTRA

While Indian and world leaders paid final respects to Gandhiji, there were protests all over India at the groups believed responsible for nurturing and supporting Godse and his accomplices. RSS members were arrested; mobs marched threateningly on RSS and Hindu Mahasabha offices all over India. And there were reports of widespread disturbances in the Marathi-speaking parts of Bombay Province and the Central Provinces—it will be recalled that Maharashtra did not then exist as an administrative unit but only as a cultural-linguistic region spread across many jurisdictions.

Newspapers from major Maharashtrian cities described the disturbances in general. English-language papers gave brief reports while Marathi papers managed, even through a curtain of censorship, to present some detail on the looting and burning of Brahman property, on the general tension, curfews, and police firings. Coverage in the English press lasted only a week or two. Marathi newspapers, especially those Brahman-owned papers that were not damaged, published whatever information they could glean under difficult circumstances and ran articles trying to figure out what had happened and why. Recent English-language reviews of the period give only a paragraph or so to these disturbances. They are, in effect, relegated to a footnote in India's history.

But the 1948 disturbances are much more than a footnote in Maharashtra's history. With total damage by mob action estimated at between Rs. 60,000,000 and Rs. 100,000,000 (from $12,000,000 to $20,000,000 in 1948 dollars)[4]; with thousands of houses burned down and thousands of persons rendered homeless; with serious setbacks to the incipient industrialization of southern Maharashtra, these events cry out for objective analysis.[5] It was an unsavory episode that brought out the worst passions of Maharashtra's dominant, and now ruling, caste—the Marathas.[6] They fell back on their age-old methods of problem-solving: on violence and retribution. In the new democratic context these events have been deliberately glossed over—they do not get any mention in the revised gazetteers, for example.[7] In the 1950s when I first started to study these disturbances, I was not permitted to see police reports and had to restrict my research to newspapers and non-official materials. Even today scholars cannot get access to Maharashtra's archival material for the period since independence. So, the definitive study is yet to come. Meanwhile, based on limited and incomplete sources, let me outline what happened, where, to whom, and why.

DISTRIBUTION AND SCOPE OF ANTI-BRAHMAN DISTURBANCES

1. *General*

The multi-million rupee destruction over a two week period was not evenly distributed throughout Maharashtra. If one believes that the main targets of the mobs were RSS and Mahasabha persons and premises, then the destruction would have been limited to the larger urban areas where these organizations operated. RSS and Hindu Sabha offices were indeed attacked in Bombay, Poona, Nagpur and other towns. But that was just the beginning. Anti-RSS sentiment sparked by the murder of Gandhi by one allegedly associated with the RSS rapidly changed into anti-Brahman anger when it became known that Godse was a Brahman, and a Chitpavan Brahman at that. The murder of Gandhi swiftly got lost in an upsurge of anti-Brahmanism—much of it blatant anti-Chitpavanism—long only barely controlled beneath the surface, but which now erupted in scores of villages and small towns.

First I shall touch upon what happened in Bombay City, Nagpur and Poona, and then focus on the area of greatest intensity: the extreme southwest of the Deccan plateau—the Desh—of the Marathi linguistic region which comprises the erstwhile British districts of Satara and Belgaum, and the then still existing princely states of the "Southern Maratha Country", that is, Kolhapur and the several principalities ruled by members of the Patwardhan family of Chitpavan Brahmans.

2. *Bombay City*

In Bombay City, clashes between Indian National Congress and Hindu Mahasabha supporters started on the night of January 30th itself, right after news of the assassination came over the radio. These clashes occurred in predominantly Marathi-speaking sections of the city, in Girgaum, Chembur, Dadar and so forth. Mobs broke into Mahasabha and RSS offices, and ransacked houses and shops belonging to known members of these organizations.[8] Trouble continued the next day when a mob estimated between 500 and 1000 gathered in front of the fiery Hindu nationalist leader Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, and began stoning it. Reports, probably rumors, had circulated that people close to Savarkar had been distributing sweets to celebrate Gandhi's death. Congress supporters were incensed and swarmed around Veer Savarkar's house, but police intervention saved him from bodily harm. But police were not in time to prevent his brother, who lived nearby, from being hurt.[9] These and many other incidents in Bombay were directly aimed at RSS and Mahasabha people, and

only incidentally were they anti-Brahman, insofar as the RSS. and Hindu Sabha leaders were Brahmans.

3. *Nagpur*

Nagpur, in 1948 still capital of the Central Provinces and Berar, had long been an important center of Maharashtrian culture. As an administrative and educational center, it had attracted Brahmans to fill posts opened up during the preceding century of British rule. These Brahmans were from several places: Hindi speakers from the Mahakoshal region to the north; Telugu speakers from Andhra to the south; and Marathi speakers who had earlier come from western Maharashtra during the eighteenth century expansionist days of the Peshwai.[10] The latter were largely Chitpavan, but included Karhada, and several kinds of Deshastha Brahmans.

In 1948, Nagpur had become the center of struggle among pro-tagonists of Samyukta ("United") Maharashtra, the Mahavidarbha Andolan ("Greater Vidarbha/Berar Movement")[11], and Congress groups who wanted to retain the status quo of a mixed Marathi-Hindi unit, and who did not want to see Nagpur lose its primacy as a capital by being absorbed into a huge state where it would have to take third place to Bombay and Poona—the latter is of course what happened.

In January 1948, Nagpur passions were running high over the widespread disturbances and unsettled conditions after the partition, as well as over Gandhi's "selling-out" to Muslims as they perceived it, the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir, and the stepped-up campaign for Samyukta Maharashtra (most of whose leaders were Chitpavans). Nagpur had been the birthplace of the RSS and a continuing center of militant Hindu groups. Now, against a background of frequent Hindu-Muslim clashes, all manner of tensions were ready to explode.

For some reason nothing happened for two days after the assassination. On February 2nd, however, mobs attacked the houses of RSS and Mahasabha leaders—Maharashtrian Brahmans—and began looting and burning. The Samyukta Maharashtra spokesman, G.T. Madkholkar, lost his house and the premises of his newspaper together with an associated publishing concern. In all, damage to Brahman property in Nagpur is estimated at over Rs. 500,000. Madholkar has chronicled this whole sordid episode, and his family's experience, in a remarkable book in which he discusses the causes of the disturbances.[12] While he himself was a Karhada Brahman, he notes that in Nagpur all Maharashtrian Brahmans are lumped together as "the enemy", with Chitpavans being the arch-enemy. Even Deshasthas make this latter discrimination, and he quotes one Deshastha Congress worker as asking, "Don't you think that people of this Chitpavan caste are just like snakes?"[13]

DISCARDED

By and large, in Nagpur the 1948 disturbances were caused by a mix of anti-Hindu Sabha, anti-RSS, and anti-Samyukta Maharashtra feelings; but the common thread was anti-Maharashtrian Brahman hatred. While not all Brahmans were Chitpavan, a large number were, and the victims who were of other Brahman *jatis* were treated as though they were Chitpavans.

4. *Poona*

Poona, the Chitpavan Brahman city par excellence, had been the capital of the Chitpavan Peshwa regime, had seen substantial Chitpavan migration from their original villages in the Konkan from the early eighteenth century on, and had become the arena during the British Raj for the work of scores of Chitpavan leaders in education, journalism, and politics (right, left, and center). This city, in particular its old part, suffered heavily in the post-assassination troubles. The Poona District Collector, in one of the few official statements available, estimated that property valued at Rs. 1,200,000 was damaged or destroyed in the city, and that another Rs. 460,000 worth of property was lost in the surrounding district.[14] It is generally believed that official estimates are understated.

The trouble in Poona started on January 31st with attacks on the residences of Hindu Mahasabha leaders. This was followed by destruction of the premises of four newspapers, including *Kal*, a violently Hindu Sabha and anti-Congress mouthpiece, and *Hindu Rashtra*, an even more anti-Gandhi, ultra-Hindu paper edited by the assassin N.V. Godse himself. For two days, houses and offices were stoned, looted, and set on fire. Restaurants, grocery shops, bookshops, printing presses—all these and similar businesses were wrecked-primarily because they represented Chitpavan power, wealth, and achievement.[15]

The ecology of the old city of Poona showed wards with heavy concentrations of caste or religious communities.[16] For instance, everybody knew that Sadashiv, Narayan, Budhwar, and Shanwar Peths ("wards") and the Tilak Road area was solid Chitpavan territory. Godses's act, which first set off ant-RSS attacks, before long became the opportunity non-Brahmans had been waiting for to retaliate against Chitpavans for long years of real or imagined domination. Crowds in lorries reportedly owned by leading Maratha politicians, and hundreds on foot surged through Brahman wards bent on revenge. Police and army units finally cut the city in half by prohibiting traffic from crossing certain streets and managed to enforce an uneasy calm after two full days of rioting.[17]

Chitpavans, attacked at the very center of their corporate life, experienced fear, anger and outrage, and could hardly believe what was going on. Ever articulate types, they reacted typically in an orgy of analysis in Marathi newspapers and magazines: "What happened to us, and why? What should Brahmans do now?" were the subjects of many thoughtful and provocative articles.

5. *Satara District*

Let us look now at events in Satara District—a heavily Maratha rural district still unchanged in outline in 1948 from British days. Aundh princely state had a few small enclaves in the middle of Satara District, but its main territory was a compact unit on the District's eastern border. According to the 1931 Census[18], an estimated 50,000 Brahmans, only 3.6% of the total population, were spread all over the district in towns and villages, as well as in Aundh State, itself ruled by a Deshastha Brahman prince. The majority of Satara's Brahmans were Deshasthas, who as *joshis* (priests and astrologers), *kulkarnis* (village accountants), and teachers were part of the traditional village structure. Only a few thousand Chitpavans lived in the district, concentrated in urban areas, but in highly visible walks of life: administration, politics, business, and professions such as law, medicine, education, and journalism. They were disproportionately in the public eye, and clearly prosperous. And in popular perception they symbolized the power that they had in the past two centuries taken over from the Maratha king in Satara as his Peshwas. Then after having lost that kingdom to the British in 1818, they came back to flaunt their superiority once again—or so go folk memories and stereotypes.

On March 22nd of 1948 the District Collector reported that the February disturbances in Satara and Aundh had resulted in Rs. 3,500,000 in damage to property by looting and incendiarism.[19] This is no doubt low since about 1000 houses were officially reported to have been burnt down in some 300 villages spread across all thirteen talukas of the District and Aundh State.[20] There are reports of "cruel, cold-blooded killing"—one family named Godse was said to have lost three male members—and there were other serious physical attacks on Brahmans. In general, the victims of arson and looting were predominantly Brahman, and judging from names in newspaper accounts, victims in towns were largely Chitpavan. Here again, targets were printing presses, schools, restaurants and dispensaries, in addition to residences. In villages, Brahmans—many of whom were farmers—had wells destroyed, grain stacks stolen, sheep and cattle pens broken, and standing crops ruined. The clear message was "Brahmans, get out!". And many did, never to return.

What brought this on in Satara District? A whole series of factors had been at work over the previous fifty years. I can mention only some in this essay.

The early 1920s saw the spread of a revived, militant, and politicized Satyashodhak Samaj, reaching into heavily Maratha rural areas through itinerant dramatic performances such as *tamashas* and *jalsas* with an overtly anti-Brahman theme. Under Satyashodhak leadership, ritual boycotting of Brahmans was extended to social boycotts (refusal of barbering and other services).[21]

Satyashodhak Samaj activities emboldened tenants to revolt against absentee landlords—many of them Brahman—with particular unrest developing in those parts of the district adjacent to Kolhapur State territory along the south.[22]

At the same time Brahman "protection societies" grew up in several towns in southern Maharashtra to counter Satyashodhak activities.[23]

Increased political activities resulted from the Montagu-Chelmsford ("Montford") reforms of 1919 which established reserved seats in the Bombay Legislature for "Maratha and Allied Castes".[24] Marathas were encouraged by the British to express themselves as Marathas, and to do battle with the Brahmans on the Council floor. Albeit with support from the British administration, they were urged to enter local and municipal government bodies in the Bombay Presidency, and in general to assert themselves as leaders of the "majority community", of what came to be called the Bahujan Samaj.

On the educational front in Satara District, in 1919 the charismatic leader Bhaurao Patil began his grass-roots, self-help organization, the Rayat Shikshan Sanstha ("Peasant Education Society").[25] Bhaurao felt that non-Brahmans should teach non-Brahmans. At the time, few non-Brahmans would or could get positions in the regular government schools, and Bhaurao felt that Brahmans who made up most of the teachers did not give enough attention to non-Brahman pupils. He himself, a Jain from Kolhapur State, had learned this in his early days under Maharaja Shahu Chatrapati. Bhaurao began to recruit and train Maratha teachers and within a context of Satyashodhak Samaj ideology and constructive action set up primary schools in a few Satara District villages, then in a few more, until he had gradually covered the district with simple schools taught by socially-conscious non-Brahmans. There were over 500 such schools by 1948. Bhaurao's Rayat Shikshan Sanstha—his own RSS—eventually broke the Brahman monopoly over elementary education, but in the process increased caste-identification and pride, and inevitably stimulated animosity towards Brahmans. At the same time, one of Bhaurao's early supporters in money and ideas was Rao Bahadur Raoji Ramchandra Kale of Satara City, a Chitpavan lawyer and political leader, and father-in-law of Professor D.R. Gadgil of Gokhale Institute fame who was himself Vice-President of the Rayat Shikshan Sanstha at one point.

With Brahmans leading Congress non-cooperation movements in Maharashtra in the early 1920s, non-Brahmans found themselves on the British side as they agreed to work the Montford reforms. By the end of the 1920s, and in the wake of Mahatma Gandhi's ascendancy after the Tilak era, Brahmans by and large left the Congress for the Mahasabha and other Hindu organizations. Non-Brahmans gradually tired of working with the British and ventured into the Congress where once more they were ranged against Brahmans.

Temperamentally more at home with violence than non-violence, Marathas in the Congress got their chance to express themselves in 1942 in the bloody "Quit India" movement.[26] Nana Patil and others in the Congress Socialist faction led many people all over Satara District in an underground terrorist movement aimed primarily at the British raj. This parallel government, or *patri sarkar*[27], had distinct anti-Brahman overtones and echoes of it lasted long in the district.

The tense World War II economic situation with its dislocation of foodgrain distribution was followed by post-war unemployment brought on by demobilization (Satara was a famous recruiting center for the British army). This kept the district unsettled in the few years left before Independence, and before Gandhi's assassination.

In one way or another all of this contributed to an escalation of anti-Brahman sentiment. And it was against this complex volatile background in Satara District that Godse's shots were a signal for violence once more.

6. *Belgaum District*

Belgaum District—in 1948 still in Bombay Province—was very different than the solidly Maratha homeland that was Satara. It was a complex transitional zone: between Marathi and Kannada speaking areas, and geologically between the Deccan lavas and the gneisses and granites of the lower Deccan resulting in differing irrigation, agriculture, and village social structures. All sorts of instabilities have developed in this much fought-over area, and the District came to be at the center of a linguistic, sectarian, caste, and jurisdictional maze. Over the years conflict and competition for power developed among the main groups: Brahmans, Muslims, Lingayats, and Jains, with the British involved in one way or another for nearly 200 years. Kannada-speaking Jains and Lingayats, both coming out of a long anti-Brahman tradition, confronted Marathi-speaking Brahmans in competition for trade and commerce as the latter edged into these fields in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Jains, in particular, also were attracted to the new educational opportunities under the British Raj, and so began to compete with Brahmans in this arena too. Lingayats entered education and politics more slowly, but were in the forefront of the Karnataka Unification Movement that eventually took most of Belgaum District out of Maharashtra. But that is a different story.

For a number of reasons, the August 1942 "Quit India" movement was extremely strong in Belgaum District—in the view of the movement's leaders, Belgaum was the model district. Huge numbers of post offices were burned down, rail and telegraph lines were cut all over, and British administration was seriously challenged. Belgaum suffered for its efforts in terms of large British-

imposed fines levied against villages especially in the district's north-west talukas.[28]

Less than six years after the August Movement, Belgaum's north-west talukas exploded again—this time in an orgy of anti-Brahmanism that is reported to have totalled Rs. 10,000,000 in damage. The disturbances raged for two weeks, and affected 175 villages (out of the district's 1200).[29] Four talukas bore the brunt of this outbreak, those in which the Marathi-speaking population was large, if not the majority. The affected places were immediately adjacent to Kolhapur State and/or intermingled with one or the other of the Chitpavan Patwardhan family states. One report pointed out that[30]:

One remarkable fact which struck us is that these events have conspicuously happened only in that part of the Province where there has been access to Marathi dailies such as *Kesari*, *Kal*,...and *Hindu Rashtra*. The purely Kannada part of the Province has remained completely unaffected.

Many of the so-called goondas who were arrested were found to be Kolhapur State subjects.[31] The Karnataka Provincial Congress Committee in its report tried to downplay anti-Brahmanism as the primary cause, preferring to see it as anti-RSS and against all those who would deride Gandhi. It did admit, nonetheless, that "untold suffering and misery [was] caused to thousands and thousands of Brahmans."[32]

In Belgaum District the victims appear to have been mostly Deshastha Brahmans—those who were traditionally in ritual or economic competition with Lingayats or Jains or who as landlords, had Marathas or other non-Brahmans as their tenants. As the KPCC report notes. many of the landlords has "RSS tendencies" thereby increasing their vulnerability as targets.[33]

7. *Kolhapur Princely State*

The Maratha princely state of Kolhapur was the scene of the second highest amount of damage in February 1948 (Sangli State, as we shall see below, suffered the most, RS. 16,000,000, with the aggregate of the five Patwardhan states affected being Rs. 23,450,000). The official enquiry report for Kolhapur gave its damage as Rs. 13,000,000. This was the enquiry ordered by the Maharaja of Kolhapur in June 1948 and carried out by Justice N.H.C. Coyajee of the Bombay High Court.[34]

In October 1948 Justice Coyajee produced a very detailed 95 page report into the events of February 1948 in Kolhapur. His findings were unambiguous in labelling the disturbances "anti-Brahman", and he was not hesitant in assigning blame.[35] Thus in his concluding remarks he writes[36]:

...the anti-Brahman feeling in the State which existed for a long number of years was brought to a head in the speeches of Madhavrao Bagal and the activities of

his immediate followers...although it is on record that the initial outburst, in the sense that the first attack was made on the Hindu Mahasabha office and some members of the RSS were also objects of attacks, a scrutiny of the evidence...shows that this was only on a very small scale [and] that the opportunity was taken by the mobs for a concerted and general attack on the Brahmin community as a whole...The object was in fact to attack the community of Brahmins residing in the city of Kolhapur and in the State.

Justice Coyajee uses the words "opportunity", "excuse", and "pretext" several times in his summary statement. He minces no words in his report, and he names names of leaders and would-be leaders, many of whom have gone on to sometimes controversial roles in Kolhapur's later political history. The Coyajee Report is a remarkable document on the anatomy of deliberately fostered violence. He shows how the trouble began in the city, and spread rapidly and purposefully. He states, for example, that "certain parties went to the mofussil by car and on bicycles and not only spread the information [that Brahman houses in the city had been burnt] but acted as *agents provacateurs*"[37] and carried with them bottles of kerosene, boxes of matches and other questionable items.

Among the report's findings are the following:

—Heavy damage occurred in the northeastern sections of the state adjacent to and mixed in with the Patwardhan states, as well as in the Chitpavan Brahman feudatory of Kolhapur called Ichalkaranji, both in its main urbanized part adjacent to Shirol as well as in its separated, more rural segment, Ajra. Gadhinglaj Peta, next to Ajra, also suffered a lot.

—The worst damage was in Kolhapur City, to all manner of Brahman-owned businesses and schools. The largest single building attacked was the Prabhakar Film Studios, actually owned by a Maratha, but one known as *bhatalela*, "Brahmanized", as also for his Hindu Mahasabha sympathies.

—A place especially badly hit was the predominantly Brahman temple complex at Narsobachiwadi at the confluence of the Krishna and Panchganga rivers. There dozens of houses belonging to temple *pujaris* (priests) were destroyed.

—Many of the attacks were led by uniformed members of the Talim Sangh, an organization of 800 or 900 members which started out as a militant wing of the Praja Parishad.[38] Members wore white shirts, khaki shorts, and carried lathis, making them sound like the Maratha equivalent of the RSS. The Coyajee Report pins much of the orchestration of the disturbances on the Talim Sangh, both in the city and the state as a whole.

How did the atmosphere in Kolhapur reach such an explosive state? That is a long and complex story, involving Shivaji's successors, the Chitpavan Brahman Peshwas of the Satara Chatrapati, the British administration, and many other factors. Some of the salient features of the story follow.[39]

In the early 1700s, the Maratha raja of Kolhapur lost out in the post-Shivaji succession struggle to become Chatrapati; he continued to function as head of what we might call the junior branch of the Maratha kingdom, the senior branch being headed by *the* Chatrapati at Satara. There are now those who refer to the Kolhapur raja as Chatrapati, a parallel Chatrapati in effect. Throughout the eighteenth century the Kolhapur raja seemed to be in trouble with his neighbors, and continually made and broke alliances. He gradually became surrounded by Chitpavan-ruled territory, beginning with a land grant, or *jagir*, of the Satara Chatrapati set up insultingly on some of his best land just east of Kolhapur town itself. This was Ichalkaranji, deeded to a Chitpavan relative of Satara's Peshwa.[40] In 1763, the Peshwa rewarded other Chitpavans, of the Patwardhan family, with land adjacent to Kolhapur in the strategic passage to the south. This was partly in an attempt to contain and control Kolhapur.

By 1818, after siding with the British in the final struggle with the Peshwa, Kolhapur was recognized as a princely state by the British, but it continued to have trouble retaining any stability, or even a ruler. In order to help its erstwhile ally, the British sent in one administrator after another—all of them Brahmans—in order to maintain the state's viability under British protection and supervision. Finally, when a stronger than usual prince took the reigns of power in 1894 at the age of 20, he, the young Shahu, was appalled to find his state administration dominated by Brahmans, most of them Chitpavans.[41] He quickly learned to distrust Chitpavans, especially when he found that the Chitpavan leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak had preempted the Maratha king Shivaji—Shahu's ancestor—as a major symbol in the cause of nationalist, anti-British activity.[42]

The young Chatrapati, Shahu Maharaj, took measures (with advice and consent from the British who by then were suspicious of Tilak's intentions and tactics) to counter Tilak, and along with him Brahmans in general. He decided to try and divest himself of Brahman administrators, and to this end in 1902 he set aside half the state's administrative positions for non-Brahmans. When he found rather few eligible non-Brahmans, he decided to encourage Marathas and others to gain the education they would need to take such positions. So he actively promoted and subsidized educational institutions, especially hostels for students from the many non-Brahman groups, one hostel for each caste or religious group. In order to counter Brahman dominance he encouraged Christian missionaries to run educational institutions. At one time he considered closing Rajaram College because it catered overly to "Advanced Classes". Eventually he persuaded the Arya Samaj to run it and propagate their anti-caste beliefs, philosophy of the primacy of the Vedas, and by-passing of Brahman priesthood.

In 1901, Shahu had begun to quarrel with Brahmans over his claim, as a Kshatriya, to Vedic rather than Puranic rituals in palace religious ceremonies.

Upon being denied them, in 1902 Shahu withdrew grants to his royal priest and to the Kolhapur Shankaracharya. After 1904, he established a Maratha priesthood that would perform Vedic rites for him, and in 1911 he supported with land grants and cash the revival of the Satyashodhak Samaj which had languished after its founder's death in 1890. Eventually he appointed a Maratha equivalent of Shankaracharya, the Ksatra Jagadguru.

Shahu early recognized the power of the largely Chitpavan press of Poona, and in an effort to counter its allegedly seditious and agitational nature, he helped to start non-Brahman newspapers in Kolhapur. They were both pro-British and anti-Brahman. He also seems to have toyed with the idea of having Maratha history "properly written", being displeased with what then existed.[43] He even began to mistrust D.B. Parasnis as a historian since he was a Brahman, albeit a Deshastha rather than Chitpavan.

By the end of Shahu's very active reign in 1922, Marathas in Kolhapur, and to some extent outside also, had had their consciousness raised, and had become as politicized within the confines of an autocratic princely state as was possible. In one of his last and most significant actions, Shahu in 1919 made a major structural change in village life by abolishing the *kulkarni vatan* (hereditary right to post of accountant usually held by Deshastha Brahman) and by appointing non-Brahman functionaries in the place of Brahmans. In sum, in all sorts of ways he served notice on Brahmans that their traditional positions were vulnerable.

The role of the British in this deliberate promotion of Marathas and other non-Brahmans—which amounted to a blatant policy of anti-Brahmanism—is becoming increasingly evident as archival sources become available.[44] They aided and abetted his efforts, and in return Shahu vowed continuing support of the British Raj all through the turbulent extremist and agitational politics of the early twentieth century and through the Great War.

After Shahu's reign there was no going back on the anti-Brahman tenor of Kolhapur affairs. It was carried on in the decades following his death by men who had been educated in the heyday of his reforms. The anti-British nationalist movement gradually was felt in princely states as well as in British India, and demands for popular government, or at least a share in government, came to Kolhapur in the late 1930s. The major figure in this demand was Madhavrao Bagal, a Maratha writer and artist who was a product of Shahu's regime and who had become a militant Satyashodhak Samaji and a vociferous anti-Brahman.[45] Bagal turned against his princely sponsor and set up the Praja Parishad ("Peoples' Congress"), an organization dedicated to gaining a semblance of democracy within an autocracy. He led tenant agitations and was jailed briefly for his trouble. Bagal then spent the 1940s working for greater popular representation within the framework of what he hoped would be a continuing autonomous

Kolhapur State. He did not relish seeing a merger of the state with a Bombay Province he saw dominated by Gujarati capitalists from Bombay City. Bagal had hopes of becoming prime minister of Kolhapur within the anticipated independent India. That was not to be. But he remained a force in politics for many years in what became Kolhapur District of the state of Maharashtra.

By 1948, another princely succession crisis was followed by the installation of an unpopular new prince and the issue of merging with independent India had heated up to boiling point. By then, too, Bagal was quarrelling intemperately with other politicians, and at the same time increasing contact with non-Brahman leaders in erstwhile British India. This all combined to set the stage for the post-assassination disturbances. And Justice Coyajee pointed to Madhavrao Bagal's role in precipitating the widespread attack on Brahmans in the state. Shahu's policies had inevitably led his non-Brahman subjects down the path to anti-Brahmanism.

8. *Sangli and other Patwardhan Princely States*

Estimates of damage to property in the Patwardhan princely states have been reported to total over Rs. 23,000,000. The most severe damage, perhaps as much as Rs. 16,000,000, occurred in Sangli State, even more than that reported for neighboring non-Brahman Kolhapur.[46] What were the the Patwardhan states, and why did they bear the brunt of this explosion?

Of the eighteen princely states of southern Maharashtra and the adjacent area of Karnataka, six were ruled by Marathas and two by Muslims—the balance of ten states was ruled by Brahmans: two (Bhor and Aundh) by Deshasthas, and eight by Chitpavan Brahmans. Of these, Ramdurg's ruler was from the Bhave family, and the other seven states were ruled by members of the Patwardhan family.

This Chitpavan family was originally from Ratnagiri District, as are all others.[47] In the early 1700s a Patwardhan family member, Harbhat, made his way up from coastal Ratnagiri over the Ghats and became the family priest, *upadhya*, of the Chitpavan chief of Ichalkaranji. The first Peshwa, Balaji Vishvanath, came to hear of the priest's impressive religious austerities and kept in touch with Harbhat and his family. Eventually Harbhat's sons took service under the Peshwa, and after distinguishing themselves in various campaigns under succeeding Peshwas, were rewarded in 1763 with several stretches of territory between the Krishna and Tungabhadra rivers, strategically situated up and down Kolhapur's eastern border. It was clearly the Peshwa's intention to use the Patwardhan's to keep Kolhapur, the rambunctious and unpredictable "junior Chatrapati", in check. This marked the beginning of a long serious of conflicts

between the Maratha Kolhapur raja and members of the Patwardhan princely family.

The Patwardhans constantly quarrelled among themselves and by the middle of the nineteenth century their original grant had been split several times among various family members. By the 1940s the British Raj recognized six separate principalities: Sangli,Jamkhandi, Miraj Senior, Miraj Junior, Kurundwad Senior, Kurundwad Junior, plus Wadi Jaghir (all of 12 square miles!) which was an offshoot of Kurundwad Senior, but carefully listed by the British Deccan States Agency as a separate entity.

Each of the Patwardhan states consisted of many dispersed units, scattered in and among five British districts. For instance, Sangli's 1,136 square miles, and its quarter of a million people, were in 35 major dispersed pieces with many more individual villages it owned isolated in the middle of British territory. The prospects for rational administration or development were consequently low. And trying to map this chaos is a real challenge.

A major bloc of three states lies in the very fertile Krishna valley to the northeast of Kolhapur, and astride the communications route between Satara and Belgaum districts. This is really the heart of the Patwardhan territory and was the site of the capital of Sangli, as well as of both branches of Miraj and Kurundwad. The main north-south railway—the old meter-guage Madras and Southern Maratha Railway—goes through this corridor and gave great prominence to Miraj which became and still is an important rail junction.

But it was in Sangli State where modernization of the economy and administration first took place in the early twentieth century. Most writers give great credit to the British administrator Captain Richard C. Burke for five years of exemplary development while he was training the youthful prince Chintamanrao Patwardhan and waiting for him to assume full powers in 1910.[48] Burke set in motion all manner of urban development programs: water works, road improvement, public buildings, introduction of free primary education, plans for higher education, embryonic local self-government bodies, a Rayat Sabha ("Peasants Assembly") for public ventilation of grievances, medical services, and so forth. By 1919, when Willingdon College was established in Sangli by the Deccan Education Society, the state had already attracted some industries. The most important early industrialist was Vishnu Ramchandra Velankar who set up his Sri Gajanan Weaving Mills in 1914.[49] Velankar, a Chitpavan Brahman like the raja, had invented a contrivance which revolutionized powerloom weaving in small establishments, and soon he was producing fashionable reasonably-priced saris that became very popular. The raja encouraged other Chitpavans to set up factories of various kinds on princely territory. In fact, from then on all sorts of industrial development took place in the various Brahman states: the Raja of Aundh supported the Kirloskars in

making agricultural equipment to start with, and he helped Gurunath Prabhakar Ogale with his pioneering glass manufac-turing. This princely patronage came at a time when the British authorities did not look kindly on Indian enterprise. Aside from the Kirloskars who were Karhada Brahmans, the pioneers in southern Maharashtra were Chitpavans, eagerly encouraged by Chitpavan rulers such as Sangli and Ichalkaranji. It was they who laid the foundations for the spectacular post-independence industrial development of the area.

The success of these pioneering industries was interrupted and badly shattered in 1948.[50] Mobs attacked buildings and machinery owned by Velankars, Dandekars, Bhides, and others. Velankar sustained the greatest loss—his had been the greatest success among Chitpavan successes. Ironically, the mindless non-Brahman mobs who attacked these factories effectively threw themselves out of work through their anti-Brahman passion. An official historian of Sangli State writes of this period[51]:

> Forces of law and order seemed utterly paralyzed. The loss suffered has been variously computed from 50 lakhs to one crore of rupees [in Sangli City]. Much of the laborious achievement of nearly half a century went up in flames and smoke.

After integration of the Patwardhan states in March 1948, and after considerable lobbying by Kirloskar and others, the Government of Bombay finally gave high priority to reconstruction, and the industrial success story continues in this part of Maharashtra. And Brahman industrial leadership still looms large.

Princely rule in the Patwardhan states continued at various autocratic levels until integration. If a prince favored industrial development, and even establishment of a college, he still could and did discourage a popular press, public meetings, and real participation in government. Censorship and arbitrary justice were common.

In the context of the general Indian nationalist movement, many Congress and other political leaders kept an eye on conditions in the states.[52] In fact many Chitpavans in Poona were in the forefront of states' peoples organizations. Among them were N.C. Kelkar, A.V. Patwardhan, and G.R. Abhyankar. In 1921, Kelkar and Patwardhan ran the first Deccan States' Peoples Conference in Poona, and set up a permanent committee. After that, attempts were made to organize the people in each state and to hold conferences locally. Some states are reported to have been the site of quite a few: Sangli had twenty, Jamkhandi had twelve, while Kolhapur and several other states had only four or so.[53] Only in Aundh, however, did this popular agitation result in a modicum of responsible government, but that was not until 1939 when the progressive ruler promulgated a model constitution and put it into effect. States' rulers by and large acceded to the holding of conferences to defuse possible agitation that might sweep through their boundaries from general Indian nationalism, but they kept a tight rein on

meetings and progressive movements. Nevertheless, the Patwardhan states, or at least their populous central bloc, were situated in between the two chief centers of the "Quit India" movement and harbored, knowingly or not, absconders from Satara and Belgaum districts. These in turn undoubtedly had an effect on the people of the sanctuary states. Thus, by 1948 the princes were being pressed from outside and inside for reform, and for merger, and if they resisted they left themselves open to popular uprising. Brahmans in the Patwardhan states had been resisting merger because they feared the fate of being lost in a post-merger Maratha majority. Such resistance was to no avail, and the Brahmans' fears and troubles were realized in February 1948 when they were set upon by recently politicized communities—Marathas, as well as Jains and Lingayats—who unhesitatingly took advantage of the opportunity provided by the assassin Godse's shots.

Another factor, in Sangli and Miraj in particular, which contributed to the ferocity of the disturbances there was the claim of these rulers to be upholders of Hindu tradition. This had inevitably led to their patronage of the Brahman-led RSS. Godse himself is reported to have spent a lot of time organizing for the RSS in the Sangli-Miraj area. Over the years, the rulers of Miraj are said to have been great patrons of indigenous Hindu gymnastics, wrestling and games, and to have lavishly supported local *akhadas* (gymnasiums). This emphasis on physical prowess tied in well with RSS philosophy and practice of physical culture for strengthening Hindu youth, and Brahman youth in particular. Its counterpart, undoubtedly not coincidental, lay in neighboring Kolhapur's network of non-Brahman *talims* (gymnasiums). In the general context of violence in this volatile area, especially after 1942, escalation of this kind of activity in Sangli or Miraj was echoed in Kolhapur, only a few miles away. Be it Brahman or Maratha, the heritage of this much fought-over part of Maharashtra has been physical resolution to conflict.

The year 1948 saw the culmination—and probably the end—of violent rivalry between Marathas and Chitpavans, a rivalry of two centuries and more which had over the years erupted on various levels and in several contexts. And the showdown unsurprisingly came in the Kolhapur-Patwardhan states area. Significantly there was very little trouble in 1948 in Jamkhandi, the second largest Patwardhan state, but the one whose main stretches of territory were the farthest from the Kolhapur epicenter of anti-Brahmanism in its many manifestations.

CHITPAVAN RESPONSE TO DISASTER: RESILIENCE AND ADAPTATION

It is tempting to suggest that the leaders of Kolhapur in the twentieth century, newly validated as Kshatriyas, finally found themselves in a position to

avenge the legendary actions of the Brahman Parashurama who is believed to have at one point exterminated Kshatriyas from the face of the earth. It is the same Parashurama who is believed to have created Chitpavans from corpses on the Konkan coast, Brahmans who would henceforth serve him. Kolhapur's anti-Chitpavanism emerged out of powerful myths and symbols. Myth and reality easily merge in Indian history.

To get back to a different plane of reality, let me now summarize points I have made in this paper. And let me repeat that I have intentionally used very broad strokes throughout and have not hesitated to make sweeping generalizations.

1. I have suggested that anti-Brahmanism in Maharashtra must be studied in its component parts. It is too broad and simplistic as a general concept for dealing with the targets of non-Brahmans which are *jati* (endogamous caste) and not *varna* (ideal social category) referents.

2. I have demonstrated that the disturbances in 1948 had differing histories, character, and levels of intensity in different parts of the large and complex Marathi-speaking region.

3. I have shown that Chitpavan Brahmans were the main targets, and that the act of one Chitpavan was the immediate cause. I might speculate that Deshasthas and others were in fact caught up in what was primarily anti-Chitpavanism. If indeed overwhelming anti-Chitpavan feeling had not existed, and had not been so easily tapped, anti-Deshastha Brahman sentiment in villages might have petered out in local accommodation between Deshasthas and Marathas, both of which groups have long had a symbiotic relationship in the traditional social structure of the Desh. Deshasthas, I have been told more than once, are really "refined Marathas".

4. I am suggesting that Konkanastha Chitpavan Brahmans were able to do everything they did in the past three centuries after venturing over the Sahyadris onto the Maharashtrian plateau heartland *because* they were "new" Brahmans—at least "new" in the social, political, and economic context of "old" Maharashtra.[54] They were a small, intrusive, mobile group whose very lack of rootedness, absence of belonging to the soil of the Desh, and lack of restraints inherent in membership of a traditional social structure, enabled them to respond rapidly to the political and military fluctuations of the eighteenth century. It was then that a few of their families established themselves in such a way as to facilitate migration of many more individuals and families to centers of power all over India throughout the nineteenth century and later. As they arrived from the Konkan, Chitpavans brought with then onto the Desh a distinctiveness, bordering on foreignness, that showed in physical characteristics, language, diet, and dress that clearly marked them. And they brought with them in addition to

this cultural baggage that set them apart, a psychological attitude—a sense of superiority, an arrogant and domineering attitude—that has not set well in the relatively egalitarian atmosphere of the Desh, symbolized by the Varkari Panth. Professor D.R. Gadgil once suggested to me that the source of the Chitpavan's domineering attitude might be found in the *khot-kul* relationship in the Konkan, a landlord-tenant relationship of great inequality that just did not transplant well to the Desh. Chitpavans have been extraordinarily adaptive in many ways, but have also been obstinate about changing attitudes.

5. I have noted that the 1948 disturbances temporarily disoriented Chitpavans as a group, and stimulated all Brahmans to review their position and future in what was, for a time, a very hostile environment. It is easier to know what Chitpavans' reactions were to this difficult time since, more than other Brahmans, they indulged in much public soul-searching. There was a spate of articles in magazines and newspapers, all trying to understand what had happened, and why and what the future might hold.

Ever the adaptive Brahmans, Chitpavans have deliberately moved into arenas where they are no longer vulnerable in a Maratha-dominated state. They avoid local politics and administration, and aim at central government jobs; they enter the officer levels of the armed forced; and above all, pioneer once again, this time in new technologies and a variety of scientific endeavors. Judging from entries in many *kula-vrittantas* ("family histories") published since 1948, many have taken their scientific, technological and business talents overseas. A disproportionately large number of Maharashtrians who have migrated to the United States in recent years appear to be Chitpavan Brahmans.

Just as they parlayed the disaster of 1818 into success, so too Chitpavan Brahmans have turned the trauma of 1948 to their collective and individual advantage.

NOTES

I have retained throughout the older anglicized place names such as Poona (now Pune) and Belgaum, and forms of personal names that have acquired currency in English language books and newspapers. In transliterating Marathi words in the following references I have mainly, but not entirely, followed the Library of Congress system.

The term "Maharashtra" refers to the cultural-linguistic Marathi-speaking region as well as to the post-1960 state which by and large encompassed the former. By Konkan is here meant primarily Ratnagiri District (recently divided into Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg) and the term Konkanastha, "being of the Konkan", usually is synonymous with Chitpavan. Chitpavan residence gradually spread into Kolaba (now Raigad) and Thana districts as well as into Greater Bombay. Desh usually refers to the Deccan plateau British districts and princely states in the upper Godavari, Bhima, and upper Krishna river basins, from Nasik in the north, south to Kolhapur. Deshastha, "being of the Desh", usually refers to a group of Brahman castes differentiated by ritual affiliation with a Vedic *shakha* ("branch"), for instance, Rigvedi, Yajurvedi, etc.

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[1]Following is a sampling of the dozens of publications on the assassination:

Tapan Ghosh, *The Gandhi Murder Trial* (New York: Asia, 1973).

Gopal Godse, *Gandhihatya ani mi* ("The murder of Gandhi and I") (Pune: Asmita, 1967) — in Marathi.

Gopal Godse, *May It Please Your Honour; Statement of Nathuram Godse* (Pune: Gopal Godse, for Vitasta Prakashan, 1977).

P.L. Inamdar, *The Story of the Red Fort Trial, 1948-49* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1979).

India (Republic) Commission of Enquiry into the Conspiracy to Murder Mahatma Gandhi. *Report*. 2 vols. (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1970) Chairman: J.L. Kapur.

Jagdish Chandra Jain, *The Murder of Mahatma Gandhi: Prelude and Aftermath* (Bombay: Chetana, 1961).

G.D. Khosla, *The Murder of the Mahatma, and other Cases from a Judge's Notebook* (London: Chatto & Windus), 1963).

Manohar Malgonkar, *The Men who Killed Gandhi* (Delhi: Macmillan, 1978).

Ashis Nandy, "Final Encounter: the Politics of the Assassination of Gandhi," in his *At the Edge of Psychology* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980).

Robert Payne, *The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: Dutton, 1968).

[2]The Chitpavan caste, one of five major Brahman groups in the Marathi-speaking region (others are Deshastha, Karhada, Saraswat, and Devarukha), numbers only about 250,000 but has had an influence in Maharashtra over the last three hundred years far out of proportion to its numbers.

Godse is reported to have stated at his trial: "I am grieved to learn that Brahmins in Maharashtra had to suffer both in life and property on account of my action." [*In the Word Quarterly* (Glasgow), vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1950), p. 65.]

[3]V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) and his *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States* (New York: Macmillan, 1956).

[4]This estimate is based on fragmentary reports in newspapers and unofficial publications. It probably understates the actual damage.

[5]No government investigation was ever undertaken and the whole affair was downplayed. References to the disturbances abound in Marathi memoirs, magazine articles and some fiction, the best-known novel being by Vyankatesh Madgulkar, *Vavtal* (Bombay: Mauj, 1964), translated into English by Pramod Kale as *Winds of Fire* (Delhi: Hind Pocket Books, 1974).

The Maharashtra Provincial Hindu Sabha set up a committee to inves-tigate the arson and looting a submitted a report later published as a pamphlet on March 1, 1949.

[6]The meaning and scope of the term "Maratha" has undergone change since the days of Shivaji. From general reference to Marathi-speaking heroic soldiers—regardless of caste—of the 17th century, the term has been narrowed to mean the non-Brahman caste cluster which is now dominant throughout Maharashtra and accounts for upwards of 35% of the population. It includes regional land-owning elites (*deshmukhs*), village headmen elites (*patils*) and the vast bulk of the lower-level peasant-farmers, formerly called Kunbis. Two important new discussions of the term "Maratha" are in 1) Rosalind O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology: Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Low Caste Protest in Nineteenth-century Western India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 15-49; 2) Jayant Lele, *Elite Pluralism and Class Rule: Political Development in Maharashtra, India* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp. 55-59.

[7]The omission is particularly striking in the Poona, Satara, and Kolhapur District Gazetteers (Bombay: Government Press, 1954, 1963 and 1960 respectively) where one would expect mention of such cataclysmic events.

[8]Brief English-language newspaper reports of the disturbances were in *Times of India, Bombay Chronicle, Free Press Journal, Statesman, Times* (London), while longer Marathi accounts were in *Lokasatta* (Bombay), and *Dnyanprakash* and *Kesari* of Poona.

[9]Dhannanjay Keer, *Savarkar and his Times* (Bombay: A.V. Keer, 1950), p. 371.

[10]Chitpavan Brahman *Peshwas* (prime ministers) ruled much of western and central India from Poona, their capital, between 1712 and 1818. This period is referred to as the *Peshwai*.

[11]Samyukta ("united") Maharashtra groups aimed to collect all Marathi-speaking areas into a new state (finally achieved on May 1, 1960), while some in the six Vidarbha (or Berar) districts around Nagpur agitated for a separate state. Sentiment for that still exists.

[12]G.T. Madkholkar, *Eka nirvastaci kahani* ("story of a regugee"), 2nd. ed. (Nagpur: Vijayua Prakashan, 1973—first pub. 1949).

[13]*Ibid.*, pp. 149-50. This passage included the familiar bilingual play on the abbreviation for Konkanashta Brahman, Ko-Bra, pronouced as the English "cobra", a favorite hostile description of Chitpavans.

[14]*Kesari*, 23 April 1948.

[15]See D.R. Gadgil's perceptive analysis, "Maharashtrian Brahmans! If you don't wake up . . ..!" in *Sahyadri*, (March 1948), reprinted in *Navashakti*, March 9 and 11, 1948 (in Marathi).

[16]D.R. Gadgil, *Poona: a socio-economic survey, Part 2* (Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1952), p. 69.

[17]*Bombay Chronicle*, Feb. 4, 1948.

[18]India. Census of India, 1931. *Bombay Presidency General Report and Tables* (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1933), vol. 8, pts. 1 & 2.

[19]*Dnyanprakash*, March 27, 1948.

[20]Y.D. Phadke (in his book *Kesavrao Jedhe*, Pune: Srividya, 1982, pp. 194-95) summarizes a report from the newspaper *Samartha* for Feb. 23, 1948 which gave taluka-wise damage statistics for Satara District.

[21]The Satyashodhak Samaj ("Truth-seeking society") was founded in 1873 by Jotirao Phule to protest alleged Brahman socio-religious domination. It petered out after Phyule's death, was half-heartedly supported by the Kolhapur raja in the early 1900s and did not really revive until the 1920s. See Gail Omvedt, *Cultural Revolt in a Colonial Society: the Non-Brahman Movement in Western India, 1873 to 1930* (Bombay: Scientific Socialist Education Trust, 1976), and O"Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*.

[22]P.P. Gokhale, *Jagrit Satara* ("Awakened Satara) (Satara: Lokaseva Sangh Prakashan, 1966, 2nd rev. & enlarged ed.), p. 141.

[23]Articles in *Kesari* June 28, 1921, August 2 , 1921, and August 29, 1922 outlining the constitution of Brahman Hitasamrakshak Sangh ("Society for protection of welfare of Brahmans").

[24]Indian Statutory Commission, vol. 7. *Memorandum submitted by the Government of Bombay* (London: Hist Majesty's Stationary Office, 1930).

[25]A large number of Marathi and English books now exist on Bhaurao Patil and his activities. One of the most recent is S.A. Kakrambe's *Karmaveer Bhaurao Patil and Mass Education Movement: its Political Impact on Maharashtra* (Bombay: Somaiya, 1983). An authorized biography is A.V. Matthew's *Karmaveer Bhaurao Patil* (Satara: Rayat Shikshan Sanstha, 1956).

[26]One of the earliest descriptions of the 1942 movement was Govind Sahai's *'42 Rebellion (An authentic review of the Great Upheaval of 1942)* (Delhi: Rajkamal Publications, 1947). A series of articles in *Kesari*, February-April 1952, entitled "Sataryantil dahashatvad" ("terrorism in Satara") discussed the background and nature of the district's continuing unrest.

[27]*Patri-sarkar* refers to government through coercion by whipping the soles of the feet of those targeted for punishment (*patra*, "metal plate" derived from the notion of "horseshoe"); sometimes changed to *prati-sarkar*, "anti-government", in the sense of "parallel government" referring to the lack of normal authority in Satara District in 1942. Nana Patil, the most famous Maratha leader of the underground, or parallel, government, is the subject of several new publications, e.g., *Krantisinha Nana Patil* ("Lion of the Revolution Nana Patil") ed. J.B. Pawar (Kolhapur: Arundhati Pub., 1983), and M.N. Thoke, *Shramikanca Kaivari: Krantisinha Nana Patil yance jivan-caritra* ("Supporter of Workers: 'Lion of the Revoution' Nana Patil's life-story") (Belgaum: Parakha Pub., 1983).

[28]Govind Sahai, *'42 Rebellion*, pp. 101-109.

[29]Reports in *Kesari* Feb. 24, 1948, March 2, 1948.

[30]Unpublished report of a special subcommittee of the Karnataka Provincial Congress Committee (KPCC) appointed on 13 April 1948, pp. 4-5. A typed copy was made available dto me in 1954.

[31]*Dnyanprakash*, April 2, 1948.

[32]*KPCC Report*, p. 3.

[33]*Ibid.*, p. 6.

[34]The Kolhapur principality was not merged into independent India's Bombay State until March 1, 1949. See V.P. Menon, *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*, pp. 208-210.

[35]Kolhapur State, *Report of the Commisison of Enquiry appointed by H,H. the Chhatrapati Maharajasaheb of Kolhapur and presided over by the Hon'ble Justice N.H.C. Coyajee...* (Kolhapur: Government Press, 9 October 1948), 96 pp. Original is marked "confidential".

[36]*Ibid.*, p. 81.

[37]*Ibid.*, pp. 47-53.

[38]*Ibid.*, pp. 62-69.

[39]In addition to standard histories of Maharashtra (Sardesai; Kincaid and Parasnis; vol. 8 of the *History and Culture of the Indian People*, etc.) see Manohar Malgonkar, *Chhatrapatis of Kolhapur* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971).

[40]Later, in fact, Ichalkaranji became a feudatory of Kolhapur and a constant thorn in its side.

[41]The earliest English biography of Shahu is by A.B. Latthe, *Memoirs of H.H. Shri Shahu Chhatrapati Maharaja of Kolhapur*, 2 vols. (Bombay: Times Press, 1924). Many recent publications include: *Descriptive Catalogue of Papers relating to Rajarshi Shahu Chhatrapati of Kolhapur (1884-1922 A.D.)*, vol. 4 (1979) and vol. 5 (1982) of the the Kolhapur Archives series published by the Government of Maharashtra (Bombay); Ian Copeland, "The Maharaja of Kolhapur and the Non-Brahman Movement, 1902-10," *Modern Asian Studies*, 7 (1973), 209-225; K.K. Kavlekar, "Shri Shahu Maharaja of Kolhapur and his Contribution to the Non-Brahman Movement," *Journal of Shivaji University* (Kolhapur), 7, 13

(1974), 73-88; and Chandra Mudaliar, *The Kolhapur Movement* (Kolhapur: Shivaji University, 1983). Books and articles in Marathi abound and cannot be noted here.

[42]See Richard I. Cashman, *The Myth of the Lokamanya: Tilak and Mass Politics in Maharashtra* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 111-122.

[43]Letters nos. 3661 and 3703-3705 to A.M.T. Jackson in 1909, cited in *Descriptive Catalogue*, vol. 4.

[44]See Ian Copeland, *The British Raj and the Indian Princes* (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1982), pp. 232-233, and his "The Maharaja of Kolhapur"cited above.

[45]Among Bagal's many writings is the autobiographical *Jivan-pravaha* ("course of my life") (Kolhapur: the author, 1954). Donald Rosenthal summarizes Bagal's career in his "From Reformist Princes to 'Co-operative Kings': Political Change in Pre-independence Kolhapur," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 8 (May 19, 1973), 903-910.

[46]Compiled from reports in *Kesari*, *Dnyanprakash*, *Lokasatta*, and *Times of India*.

[47]Two Patwardhan family histories have been published: G.V. Apte, *Sansthanika Patvardhana gharanyaca itihasa* ("history of the princely Patwardhan family') (Wai: for the author, 1919, 272 pp.); and V.G. Patwardhan *Patvardhana-kula-vittanta* (Sangli: for the author, 1958, 402 pp.)

[48]P.M. Limaye, *Sangli State: 1910-1948* (Sangli: the author, 1955), pp. 14-23. See also *Notes on the Sangli State* , compiled by R.C. Burke for the education of the young raja Chintamanrao (Sangli, 1909, 477 pp.).

[49]See Limaye, *Sangli State*, p. 74. Also Vishnu Ramchandra Velankar, *Velankara kula-vrittanta* (Sangli: the author, 1938), pp. 117-119. Velankar notes (p. 117) that the 1905 Swadeshi movement stimulated him to study weaving at the Calcutta National Weaving School and he then proceeded to set up three handlooms. These were successful, so in 1912 he set up three machine-looms in Poona, but found that Poona was not a good place for a fledgling Indian enterprise. In 1914 he moved his power-looms to Sangli princely state and gained the support of a sympathetic raja.

[50]Two long editorials in *Kesari* (March 26 and 30, 1948) detail the damage to southern Maharashtra industries estimated at one and a quarter crores of rupees, then about $2,500,000. These editorials followed a March 12 report of the Maratha Chamber of Commerce delegation which met the then Home Minister of Bobmay State, Moraji Desai, to demand assistance in reha-bilitation and reconstruction.

[51]Limaye, *Sangli State*, p. 275.

[52]General background can be found in Vishvanath Anant Patwardhan's *Daksina Maharastratila Sansthanancya Vilinikaranaci kata* ("the story of the integration of the states in southern Maharashtra") (Pune: the author, 1966).

[53]*Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

[54]The phrase "new Brahmans" has been used recently by two writers: D.D. Karve, *The New Brahmans* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), and

Ravinder Kumar, "The New Brahmans of Maharashtra," in *Soundings in Modern South Asian History*, ed. D.A. Low (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 95-130. The meaning of the term for both these writers is "modern" or "modernizing". Perhaps the word "new" is more appropriately applied exclusively to Chitpavan Brahmans on account of their arrival as a new element in Maharashtrian history around 1700. They were neither liberal nor orthodox, modernizing nor conservative. They were simply new on the scene, and, unhampered by ties and tradition, could and did do all manner of un-Brahmanlike things. They innovated then, and still do.